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NOTES AND COMMENTS
with a police officer. The court went on to say that the defendant had
a perfect right to make the inquiries of a police officer. In Chicago v.
Brod8 the defendant at the scene of another's arrest commented, "Well,
he [referring to the arresting officer who had his gun in hand] doesn't
have to shoot him."9  The court, reversing the conviction for inter-
fering with justice, asked: "If this pronouncement of the trial judge is
sustainable, where are our boasted liberties? Must the citizen be be-
holden to the whim and humor of the police for his freedom ... ?"10 In
District of Columbia v. Little" the defendant refused to unlock the door
of her home for a health officer and remonstrated on constitutional
grounds. The defendant's actions were held not to be an interference.
The court said that although force or theatened force is not always an
indispensable ingredient of the offense of interfering with an officer in
the discharge of his duties, mere remonstrances or even criticisms of an
officer are not usually held to be the equivalent of unlawful interference.
In People v. Pilkington,12 while the police officer was putting prisoners
into the patrol car, the defendant advised the prisoners to keep their
mouths shut and a lawyer would soon be on the way. The court held
this not to be a violation of the city ordinance which states that it is
unlawful to harm, obstruct, or resist any officer in the performance of
his duties.
Under the court's interpretation in the principal case, a police officer
cannot be questioned by an innocent bystander. The statute 3 so inter-
preted makes orderly protests to a police officer punishable as a matter of
law by $5,000 fine or five years imprisonment or both.
NICK J. MILLER
Domestic Relations-Custody-Contests Between Parent and
Nonparent
Probably one of the most important and yet most unsettled areas of
the law today is that of custody of children, particularly in a contest
between a parent and nonparent. As early as 18761 the North Carolina
Supreme Court held that the trial judge erred when he was of the
opinion that in law the mother had a primary right (as against the
1141 Ill. App. 500 (1908).
9Id. at 501. 'ld. at 502.
11339 U.S. 1 (1950). Although not squarely in point, this case was included
because it arose in the same jurisdiction. Also, it should be pointed out that in
1953 D.C. CODE § 22-505(a) (1951) was amended; the phrase, "personal violence
upon an officer," was deleted, and the phrase, "assaults, resists, opposes, impedes,
intimidates or interferes with any officer," was inserted. D.C. CoDE § 22-505(a)
(Supp. VI 1958).
2 199 Misc. 665, 103 N.Y.S.2d 64 (County Ct. 1951).
1 D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-505 (Supp. V 1956).
'Spears v. Snell, 74 N.C. 210 (1876).
1958]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
child's uncle) 'to the custody of the child. On the other hand, as recently
as 1949, the court in the case of In re Cranford2 held that "where the
fitness of the petitioner [mother] is unchallenged the natural right of
the parent to the custody of the child cannot be denied because a more
suitable custodian or a more advantageous environment is available..
and that "the question of unsuitability is one which must be advanced
and shown by the [nonparent] respondent."3  Since this decision there
have been three rather significant opinions indicating that the court is
abandoning the rule of the Cranford case and returning to its 1876
position. These culminate in the principal case of In re Gibbons.4
The first of these cases is Wall v. Hardee,5 in which the mother
sought the custody of her six year old illegitimate son from the child's
aunt. The trial court found the mother to be of good moral character
and to bear a good reputation at that time. The trial judge concluded
that as the natural mother of the child, she had the primary, natural,
and legal custody and control of the child and that the burden of showing
her unsuitability was on the aunt. Since the aunt failed to sustain the
burden, the court awarded the child to the mother. The supreme court
remanded the case to find further facts, citing the rule in In re Cranford,
but adding: "This rule is not absolute. There have been, and will be,
cases where the best interests of the bastard child required that its
custody be taken from the mother, and placed elsewhere. While the
courts are reluctant to do this, for reasons real as well as apparent, they
do not hesitate, where it clearly and manifestly appears the best interests
and welfare of the child demand it."'0 Thus the rule set out in In re
Cranford was substantially weakened.
The second of these cases, Holmes v. Sanders,7 came about one year
later. The father sought the custody of his minor child from the child's
maternal grandparents. The supreme court in a per curiam opinion
affirmed an award of custody to the grandparents without requiring the
grandparents to establish the unsuitability of the father. In fact, no
mention was made of the suitability or unsuitability of the natural
parent.8
The third and'principal case, In re Gibbons, hat been before the
supreme court two times.a Both trial judges made detailed findings
2231 N.C. 91, 56 S.E.2d 35 (1949), 28 N.C.L. REv. 323 (1950).
3 Id. at 95, 56 S.E.2d at 39. 4247 N.C. 273, 101 S.E.2d 16 (1957).
240 N.C. 465, 82 S.E.2d 370 (1954), 33 N.C.L. REV. 193 (1955).
Id. at 466, 82 S.E.2d at 372.
7243 N.C. 171, 90 S.E.2d 382 (1955), 35 N.C.L. REV. 225 (1956).
s The court in its two sentence opinion stated it is a "well settled principle in
North Carolina that in matters pertaining to their custody, the welfare of children
is 'the polar star by which the discretion of the courts is to be guided' . . . " Ibid.
' The case was first reported in 245 N.C. 102, 86 S.E.2d 759 (1955). It was
remanded because the trial judge privately examined several of the witnesses, in-
cluding the child, and refused to allow the child to be examined in open court.
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of fact which showed that the respondent and his wife adopted the
child in April 1949. One month later respondent's wife died. The
child after several months was placed with petitioners, a college professor
and his wife who had no children of their, own. The child remained
with them until August 1954,10 when the respondent forcibly took the
child from a Sunday school room which resulted in his trial and con-
viction for disturbing religious worship. From the time of the death of
his first wife until his remarriage in 1952, the respondent was excessive
in his use of alcohol. . After his remarriage he began to control his
drinking but occasionally he would drink excessively. B6th trial judges
found both respondent and petitioner' fit, and proper persons to have
the custody of the child. After finding the facts, the trial judge in the
principal case concluded that this is "'a contest between one who has
the legal custody, and one who does not, and the rule of law in such
cases is that it must appear that the welfare of the child clearly requires
that he be taken away from the one who has the legal custody.' Upon
the foregoinig facts the court is of the opinion that it does not appear that
the best interests of the child clearly require that he be taken away from
respondent who has legally adopted him."'1
On appeal the supreme court reversed. One basis 12 for the reversal
was the feeling "that the learned Judge felt so 'cramped by his opinion
that in law' the respondent had a primary right to the custody of the
boy, that he overlooked the interest and welfare of the boy."'13 Had the
10 One factor on which the supreme court relied in its decision in the principal
case was that the parent voluntarily permitted the child to remain continuously
in the custody of others in their home for such lengths of time that "the love and
affection of the child and the foster parents have become mutually engaged, to the
extent that a severance of this relationship would tear the heart of the child, and
mar his happiness." 247 N.C. at 280, 101 S.E.2d at 21. In the past the North
Carolina courts seem to have considered only the question of whether the child
had been abandoned, but the view in the principal case seems more in line with
the modern trend in custody controversies. Brickell v. Hines, 179 N.C. 254, 102
S.E. 309 (1920) ; Newsome v. Branch, 144 N.C. 15, 56 S.E. 509 (1907) ; Latham v.
Ellis, 116 N.C. 30, 20 S.E. 1012 (1895); 67 C.J.S., Parent and Child § 12(e)
(1950).1247 N.C. at 277, 101 S.E.2d at 19.
The second was that there was nothing in the record of the findings of fact to
indicate that the trial judge gave any consideration to the wishes of the child.
There have been many cases touching on this point in North Carolina, and there
is no set age limit at which a child may or may not be heard, but its age and
intelligence go to the weight of the evidence. Raper v. Berrier, 246 N.C. 193, 97
S.E.2d 782 (1957) ; James v. Pretlow, 242 N.C. 102, 86 S.E.2d 759 (1955) ; Harris
v. Harris, 115 N.C. 587, 20 S.E. 187 (1894) ; Spears v. Snell, 74 N.C. 210 (1876).
13 247 N.C. at 282, 101 S.E.2d at 23. "It is an entire mistake to suppose the
court is at all events bound to deliver over a child to his father, or that the latter
has an absolute vested right in the child. Doubtless, parents have a strict legal
right to have the custody of their infant children as against strangers. However,
courts -will not regard this parental legal right against strangers as controlling,
when circumstances connected with the present and prospective welfare of the
child clearly exist to overcome it, or when to enforce such legal right will imperil
the personal safety, morals or health of the child." Id. at 278, 101 S.E.2d at 20.
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supreme court followed the Cranford rule, it undoubtedly would have
held otherwise as to this point, since the nonparent had not proved the
parent to be unsuitable. In fact, the trial court found the parent to be
suitable.
Two justices dissented in that they believed a correct statement of
the governing law is found in James v. Pretlow,14 which is interpreted
by them to mean "that a parent, who has legal responsibility for his
child and who is a fit and proper person to have custody, is entitled to
custody unless for the most substantial and sufficient reasons the interests
and welfare of the child clearly require that custody be awarded to
another."' 5
The gist of the majority opinion in the Gibbons case seems to be to re-
tain the distinction between custody controversies involving only parents
and those involving parents and nonparents. It still recognizes the right
of a natural parent to his child but makes the custody determination on
the basis of what will be in the best interest and welfare of the child.
This is a fine distinction, but one which is made according to the mod-
ern American rule.1 6  The common law right 17 of the parent to the
primary consideration is thereby changed to a lesser consideration as a
basis for a custody award as between a parent and a nonparent.
This modern American rule has been stated by the courts in at least
three different ways. Some courts describe the parent as "prima facie
entitled to custody of his minor child."'18 Others say that "although it
is presumed the child's welfare will be best subserved in the care and
-1242 N.C. 102, 86 S.E.2d 759 (1955) (a controversy between the natural
mother and a stepmother of 16 year old twins). The case stated the following
rule: "Where one parent is dead, the surviving parent has a natural and legal right
to the custody and control of their minor children. This right is not absolute,
and it may be interfered with or denied but only for the most substantial and
sufficient reasons, and is subject to judicial control only when the interests and
welfare of the children clearly require it." Id. at 104, 86 S.E.2d at 761. Both
the majority and the dissent in the Gibbons case cite and rely to a great degree
upon this statement.
15247 N.C. at 285, 101 S.E.2d at 25. It is interesting to note that neither
the majority nor the dissent cite the Cranford case. This could indicate that none
of the justices desire to follow the Cranford rule any longer.
"°Armstrong v. Green, 260 Ala. 39, 68 S.W.2d 834 (1953) ; Dunavant v. Duna-
vant, 31 Tenn. App. 634, 219 S.W.2d 910 (1949); Note, 19 So. CALIF. L. Ray.
72, 73 (1945).
"' EvERSLEY, DoMEsTIc RELATIONS 412 (5th ed. 1937) states: "By the common
law of England, the father had the right to the custody of his infant children
as against third parties, and even as against the mother, though the child were
an infant at the breast." However, in 2 KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AiERICAN
LAw § 205 (Lacy's rev. ed. 1889), it is said: "The strict custody of the father
at common law was later modified so that the courts of justice may, in their sound
discretion, and when the morals, or safety or interests of the children strongly
require it, withdraw the infants from the custody of the father or mother, and
place the care and custody of them elsewhere." See also United States v. Green,
26 Fed. Cas. 30, No. 15, 256 (C.C.D.R.I. 1824) ; State v. Smith, 6 Greenleaf 462
(Me. 1830).
SIn re Jackson, 164 Kan. 391, 397, 190 P.2d 426, 431 (1948).
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custody of a parent the presumption is rebuttable."'19 Still other courts
make no finding of the parent's fitness or unfitness but award the custody
of the child on the basis of its welfare and best interests. 20  On the whole,
the courts today seem to be carefully weighing the facts, giving some
consideration and weight to the fact that one party is a parent, and
then making a decision as to what is best for the child, as in the principal
case.
In view of the full and complete findings in the principal case by the
trial courts and the discussion and application of the modern American
view of custody controversies between parent and nonparent by the
supreme court, it is hoped that the common law view of the primary right
of a parent to his child (which must prevail unless the parent is shown
to be unsuitable) is now overruled in North Carolina.
FRANCIS 0. CLARKSON, JR.
Domestic Relations-Divorce-Abandonment as a Defense to Divorce
on the Ground of Two Years Separation
In order to illustrate clearly one problem in North Carolina divorce
law, this hypothetical situation is posed: a married man living in North
Carolina decides that he can no longer live with his wife in harmony,
although she has not been guilty of any misconduct which would be
grounds for divorce. He desires a divorce but his wife is not willing
to give him one. Could this husband separate from his wife for a period
of two years, continue to support her throughout this period, and then
obtain a divorce on the ground of two years separation under G.S.
§ 50-6?1
The legislative history of divorce on the ground of two years separa-
tion in North Carolina seems to demonstrate that the legislature intended
to authorize a divorce by either party upon living separate and apart for
a period of two years irrespective of how the separation came about.
2
10 Finken v. Porter, 246 Iowa 1345, 1348, 72 N.W.2d 445, 446 (1955).
20 Henry v. James, 222 Ark. 89, 257 S.W.2d 285 (1953) ; Prince v. Carrington,
62 So. 2d 77 (Fla. 1952) ; Holmes v. Sanders, 243 N.C. 171, 90 S.E.2d 382 (1955).
This has led at least one writer to say, "Moreover, a divorced spouse would do
well not to allow the children to become overly fond of the baby sitter." Note, 7
ARK. L. Rav. 405, 408 (1953).
' N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-6 (1950) provides: "Marriages may be dissolved and
the parties thereto divorced from the bonds of matrimony on the application of
either party, if and when the husband and wife have lived separate and apart for
two years, and the plaintiff or defendant in the suit for divorce has resided in the
State for a period of six months. This section shall be in addition to other acts
and not construed as repealing other laws on the subject of divorce."
'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-5(4) (1950), originally enacted in 1907, authorizes
divorce upon a separation for a specified period, but the court has held that the
plaintiff had to establish that he was the injured party. Sanderson v. Sanderson,
178 N.C. 339, 100 S.E. 590 (1919). Then in 1931 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-6 (1950)
authorized divorce on the basis of separation without mentioning that the plaintiff
19581
